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Tax Increment Financing in North Carolina: The Myth of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty
In November 2004, North Carolina voters narrowly adopted
Amendment One,1 an amendment to the state's constitution that
permits local governments to use a form of tax increment financing
("TIF").2 Called "project development financing" by the authorizing
legislation,3 this new tool allows local governments to issue bonds to
help develop, in conjunction with private entities, defined territories
within a locality for commercial use.4 The local government then
applies the bond revenues to improve infrastructure, tear down
buildings, or pay for other costly, up-front development expenses in
an effort to spur further private development.' As security for the
bonds, local governments pledge the additional ad valorem tax
revenues expected from the redeveloped area's increased property
values and commercial activity.6 Under this financing scheme, local
governments can accomplish all of this without voter approval.7
An impressive coalition of proponents8 lauded the legislation as
an important step for the state's economy, particularly as the state
hemorrhaged jobs in three important industries: tobacco, furniture,
1. See 2004 General Election Results, http://www.sboe.state.nc.us (last visited
August 30, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
2. See Richard Rubin, Amendment 1: A New Tool, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Dec.
13, 2004, at B1.
3. Act of Aug. 7, 2003, ch. 403, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 1157 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of N.C. CONST. art. V and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105,158 to 160A (2003)).
4. See N.C. B. Summ., 2003 Reg. Sess. S.B. 725 (2003) (stating that the legislation
authorizing project development financing would permit government units "to borrow
money, without voter approval, to finance the public portion of certain economic
development projects within a defined territorial area").
5. Josh Reinert, Comment, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is it Time for
Blight and But-For To Go?, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1019, 1020 (2001).
6. See id. at 1027.
7. See § 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1157-58.
8. See Tom Ashcraft, Editorial, Preserve Democracy; Reject Amendment One,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 4, 2004, at 13A ("Under an umbrella organization called
'North Carolinians for Jobs and Progress,' proponents include former governors Jim
Holshouser, Jim Hunt and Jim Martin; some counties, cities and towns; many chambers of
commerce; real estate and banking groups; business organizations; and associations of
local officeholders."); see also Mark Binker, Amendment Backers Pitch in $1.6 Million,
GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Oct. 27, 2004, at Al (stating that law firms, power
companies, and other powerful corporations such as Blue Cross Blue Shield, Wachovia,
and Bank of America were among the largest contributors to the campaign in support of
the TIF legislation).
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and textiles.9

The

amendment's supporters argued

1527
that the

amendment would make the state more competitive in the global
economy, create new jobs, and attract industry to depressed areas. 10
Critics argued that TIF simply does not work to achieve its stated
goals."

Further, opponents claimed that TIF skews investment

decisions, clouds economic signals in a competitive market, and leads
to damaging competition between cities and towns. 12 Perhaps most
importantly, critics charged that TIF options, because they do not
require voter approval, reduce the fiscal accountability of local
government officials and undercut basic democratic principles.13

9. See ConstitutionalAmendments, Editorial, STAR-NEWS (Wilmington, NC), Oct.
19, 2004, at 10A (arguing that cities and counties need TIF authorization because of the
job losses in the state's textile, manufacturing, and tobacco industries); see also For
Amendment One, Editorial, CHARLOTTrE OBSERVER, Nov. 1, 2004, at 18A (citing "rapid
declines in [the state's] traditional industries" as a reason for supporting project
development financing).
10. Michael Lowrey, Debate About Amendment One Heats Up, CAROLINA J.
ONLINE, (Sept. 29, 2004), at http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display-exclusive.
html?id=1845 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
11. In terms of organization and fundraising, the amendment's chief critic may have
been the North Carolina chapter of the Americans for Prosperity Foundation (AFPF). See
Binker, supra note 8, at Al (stating that the AFPF raised $175,000 in opposition to the
amendment). According to its mission statement, "AFPF educates and engages citizens in
support of restraining state and federal government growth, and returning government to
its constitutional limits." Americans for Prosperity Foundation, at http://www.americans
forprosperity.org/about.html (last visited August 30, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). Critics also included North Carolina-based policy think-tanks from across
the political spectrum, such as the libertarian John Locke Foundation and the liberal
Common Sense Foundation. J. Andrew Curliss, Hunt Campaignsfor Amendment, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 29, 2004, at 6B. Michael Joyce, a member of the Cary
Town Council, was another vocal critic of the proposal. Id. Joyce has since co-founded a
website to track the uses and potential abuses of TIF in the state. See The North Carolina
Tax Increment Finance Website, at http://nctifuse.org/ (last visited August 30, 2005) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
12. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 1037-38.
13. Ashcraft, supra note 8, at 134 (arguing that TIF defeats the policy reasons for the
constitution's direct democracy requirements for local government debt).
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The countermajoritarian difficulty, 4 as this Recent Development

will refer to this last criticism, seems most important. The other
arguments focus on the empirical effects of using TIF-whether TIF
actually works in practice-but the countermajoritarian argument
militates against using TIF even if this form of financing proves
economically beneficial. In other words, the arguments relating to
TIF's empirical results are largely irrelevant if the process by which
TIF is implemented is theoretically indefensible or illegitimate. Thus,
this Recent Development largely leaves aside policy questions related

to the efficacy of TIF and instead examines whether North Carolina's
TIF legislation, by allowing local governments to circumvent normal

voter approval requirements, has a legitimate place in our state's
system of governance."
To answer this fundamental question, this Recent Development
first provides a brief history of the use and development of TIF in
other

states.

Next, this

Recent

Development

explores

the

amendment to the North Carolina Constitution that authorized the
use of TIF and the particulars of North Carolina's enabling

14. The term "countermajoritarian difficulty" typically refers to the "apparent tension
between judicial review and the democratic process." See Barry Friedman, The History of
the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part One: The Road to JudicialSupremacy, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 333, 334 (1998). TIF, as discussed in this Recent Development, has little to do
with judicial review and is itself a product of the democratic process (both as a power
authorized by the state legislature and a tool implemented by elected local government
officials). Because TIF allows local governments to circumvent the traditional voter
requirements for general obligation bonds, TIF presents officials with another way to
finance projects that the community as a whole may not want. In this sense, critics
contend that TIF procedures create the potential for countermajoritarian debt policies. I
use the term "countermajohitarian difficulty," therefore, as a shorthand for this line of
criticism.
15. Clearly, North Carolina's governmental units could borrow money through
various financing structures without voter approval for certain specific purposes long
before the voters approved Amendment One and the General Assembly passed the
project development financing legislation. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-37.2 (2003)
(authorizing the state to enter into lease-purchase agreements of prison facilities without
voter approval); id. § 159B-24 (authorizing municipalities and joint agencies to issue bonds
for the construction of energy and power generation facilities or systems without voter
approval); id. § 159D-44 to -45 (authorizing the North Carolina Capital Facilities Finance
Agency to issue special obligation bonds to finance various educational facilities and other
special purpose projects without voter approval); id. § 1591-30(1) (authorizing local
government units to issue special obligation bonds to finance certain projects, including
economic development and urban renewal projects, without obtaining "the consent of any
department, division, commission, board, body, bureau, or agency of the State and without
any other proceedings or the happening of any conditions or things" not expressly
mentioned in the chapter); id. § 160A-480.8 (authorizing financing authorities to issue
revenue bonds without voter approval to pay for regional facilities such as arenas,
coliseums, or museums).
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legislation. This Recent Development then argues that communities
and states implemented bond election requirements as both a

substantive and procedural check on local government debt levels but
that voter approval requirements cannot provide the substantive

oversight promised and add little to the procedural checks already in
place. Thus, charges that TIF's countermajoritarian effects threaten
the financial well-being of the state's cities, towns, and counties are
either misguided or beside the point. As communities around the
state begin to develop projects and facilities with TIF proceeds, the
debate should focus instead on the realities of TIF implementation:

identifying the circumstances and uses most ideal for TIF and
remaining vigilant for TIF misuse.
Turning first to the evolution of TIF as an economic
development

tool,

when

North

Carolina

voters

approved

Amendment One in November 2004, the state became the forty-ninth
state to authorize some form of TIF. 16 California first authorized TIF
in 1952 after voters in local elections rejected proposals to match
federal funds for urban redevelopment efforts. 7 After TIF proved
effective in completing the federal projects, California turned to TIF
as a tool for dealing with urban blight.18 Other states followed suit,
and, over time, the vast majority of states adopted various forms of
TIE. 19

Initially intended for the limited purpose of addressing blighted
areas, states broadened TIF's applicability as local government units

faced new economic challenges. ° In the 1970s, federal urban
development money became scarce. 21 To make matters worse,
16. See Act of Aug. 7, 2003, ch. 403, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 1157 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of N.C. CONST. art. V and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105, 158 to 160A
(2003)) ("[O]ver 48 other states and local governments in other states are authorized to
utilize ... project development financing to attract private sector economic development
.... ); Richard Rubin, How Should We Pay for PublicProjects, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Oct. 22, 2004, at 1A (stating that North Carolina and Arizona were the only two states that
had not authorized some form of TIF).
17. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 1023-24.
18. Id. at 1024-25.
19. Id. at 1024 n.37.
20. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development,
and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. 305, 318 (2004) (stating that a
majority of states eventually added some form of "economic development" to the list of
authorized TIF uses).
21. Reinert, supra note 5, at 1024; see George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That's Right
for CaliforniaRedevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 995-96 (2001) (stating that state
and local governments used TIF as a substitute for federal urban redevelopment
programs). The federal government ended its formal urban renewal program in 1974 as
Benjamin B. Quinones,
part of President Nixon's "new federalism" initiative.
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manufacturers and other employers fled overseas in response to the
forces of globalization forcing many governmental organizations to
look for new economic development tools to solve the problems

associated with empty factories and long unemployment lines.22
Cities desperate for money but reluctant to raise their general tax
rates turned to TIF to cover the large costs associated with converting

manufacturing districts into service-oriented commercial facilities or
23
to provide the public subsidies many industries had grown to expect.
Thus, what cities and counties once viewed as a targeted strategy to

combat urban blight quickly evolved into a versatile economic
development "tool"'24 with broad applicability.

While the basic mechanics of TIF are similar nationwide, TIF
authorizing legislation varies from state to state. Despite this
variation, most states require that the jurisdiction satisfy some
variation of the "blighting" and "but-for" tests before issuing TIF
bonds.2 The blighting test reflects TIF's original purpose-urban
Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with Resident Control, 27 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 689, 703-04 (1995). Though up-front federal money ended, some
money continued to flow into cities for urban development through the Community
Development Block Grant program, which replaced the formal urban development
program. See id. at 704; see also Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 101, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5321.
(2005)). Overall, though, federal funding decreased, and cities turned to a combination of
strategies, including TIF, to supplement their redevelopment funds. See Quinones, supra,
at 704.
22. In an effort to attract and retain industry to their areas and keep employment
levels high, local governments have responded to the economic pressures of globalization
and the decentralization of urban development efforts by dramatically increasing the use
of economic development incentives of all kinds over the last twenty years. See Nicole
Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
934, 956-58 & n.147 (2003) (discussing the "dizzying array" of economic development
incentives, including TIF, that cities have increasingly offered to businesses in the face of
economic pressure over the past two decades). See generally Audrey G. McFarlane, Local
Economic Development Incentives in an Era of Globalization: The Exploitation of
Decentralizationand Mobility, 35 URB. LAW. 305 (2003) (discussing globalization's role in
increasing the use, and abuse, of local economic development subsidies and calling for a
new paradigm for local economic development).
23. Reinert, supra note 5, at 1020.
24. In the campaign leading up to the vote on Amendment One, "tool" became a
loaded term.
See So What Does "Tool" Mean?, PRNEwSWIRE, at http://www.
prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/10-192004/0002288171&EDATE= (Oct. 19, 2004) (quoting an amendment opponent's assertion
that "'tool' is code for higher taxes, wasteful government spending, more debt, an
increase in corporate welfare, and the elimination of your right to vote on government
debt") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
25. See Todd A. Rodgers, Note, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing
and Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 164 (1998) ("Like their
urban redevelopment predecessors, the original California statute and most TIF statutes
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renewal-but in some states the term has become a bit of a
misnomer. 6 In Missouri, for example, local governments can also
satisfy the test by showing that the designated development district is
a "conservation area, or an economic development area.

'27

The but-

for test requires jurisdictions to establish that private development
would not occur in the redevelopment area without TIF.28 In theory,
this test prevents local governments from aiding private development
in an area that would attract investment on its own.2 9
In August 2003, the North Carolina General Assembly
authorized the use of TIF when it passed Senate Bill 725.30

The

legislation, which included the proposed constitutional amendment
and the corresponding ballot measure, did not take effect until the
voters

approved

the amendment in November

2004.31

The

constitutional amendment explicitly permits the General Assembly to
that have followed contain language that restricts the use of eminent domain to the
elimination of blight and blighted areas.").
26. See id. at 164-65 (stating that TIF has evolved in several states to include the
redevelopment of non-blighted areas in the interest of economic development); see, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 29.47.460 (Michie 2004) (authorizing the use of TIF to cure areas of
blight or in "an area that is capable of being substantially improved based on the property
value within the area"); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-44-3 to -5 (2005) (authorizing the use of
TIF to develop areas "in which the current condition of the area is less desirable than the
redevelopment of the area for new commercial, residential, industrial, office, or other
uses, or a combination of uses"); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3245.1 (Michie 2005) (stating that
in addition to curing blight, local governments may issue TIF "to promote the commerce
and prosperity of the citizens of the Commonwealth").
27. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 99.810 (2005). The Missouri statute defines a "blighted
area" as an "area which ... retards the provision of housing accommodations or
constitutes an economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals,
or welfare in its present condition and use." Id. § 99.805(1). The statute defines a
"conservation area" as an area "in which fifty percent or more of the structures in the area
have an age of thirty-five years or more" and that is "not yet a blighted area but is
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare and may become a blighted
area." Id. § 99.805(3). An "economic development area," meanwhile, is an area in which
TIF redevelopment will achieve one of three goals: "[d]iscourage commerce, industry or
manufacturing from moving their operations to another state; ... [r]esult in increased
employment in the municipality; or .. . [r]esult in preservation or enhancement of the tax
base of the municipality." Id. § 99.805(5).
28. Reinert, supra note 5, at 1020.
29. Some have argued that the but-for test is essentially meaningless because local
units cannot prove the necessity of the development by any objective measure. Without a
testable standard, challengers have a difficult time producing concrete evidence to rebut
the municipality's conclusions on the matter. An issuing unit's conclusory statement that
the test has been met is often enough, in fact, to meet the test. See id. (citing Jeffrey I.
Chapman, Tax Increment Financingas a Tool of Redevelopment, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 184 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1998)).
30. Act of Aug. 7, 2003, ch. 403, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 1157 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of N.C. CONST. art. V and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105, 158 to 160A (2003)).
31. See id. §§ 24-25, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1179.
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authorize local governments to define development territories and
issue TIF bonds to "finance public improvements associated with
private development projects within the territorial areas. ' 32 As long
as the local government unit does not pledge its taxing power as
security for the bonds, the amendment circumvents the traditional
requirements found in the constitution's other sections dealing with
local government debt 33-namely, the constitutional mandate that
local governments seek voter approval before increasing their general
obligation debt levels. 34 The amendment also alters the constitution
to allow local government units to enter into binding agreements with
property owners within a development district that would set
minimum tax values for their properties.
The remainder of the bill contains the actual enabling legislation
for TIF in North Carolina, adding definitional detail and procedural
teeth to the amendment's broad authorization and description of the
basic TIF mechanism. The bill also provides local governments with a
roadmap that they must follow in order to gain approval for their TIF
bonds.36 After defining the development financing district ("DFD"),
formulating a development financing plan, and gaining approval from
the Local Government Commission,37 the issuing unit establishes the

"base valuation" for the DFD by freezing the tax value of all real and
personal property within the financing district as of January 1 of the
year the district is created.38 Thereafter, the unit assesses the DFD's
property annually, and taxes paid on the property up to the DFD's
base value go to the area's normal taxing jurisdictions as if no DFD
had been designated.39
If property values within the DFD increase such that the DFD
generates incremental tax revenues, the issuing unit then sets aside a
proportion of the incremental tax value in a reserve increment fund.4 °
The money set aside 41in this reserve account secures the TIF bonds
and services the debt.
The enabling legislation also implements another change
authorized in the constitutional amendment: the use of minimum
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1157.
Id.
See N.C. CONsT. art. V, § 2.
§ 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1157.
See id. §§ 2-23, N.C. Sess. Laws at 1158-79.
See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
§ 2, N.C. Sess. Laws at 1159.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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value agreements ("MVAs"). 42 These agreements help ensure that
the plan will generate enough tax revenues to service the TIF
instruments by establishing a floor for the financing district's tax base.
Even if actual property values in the district remain unchanged or fall
over time, the unit has some certainty that the DFD will continue to
generate enough tax revenue to prevent default.43 MVAs are binding
on the property owners and their successors in interest, and they
remain in force for the duration of the financing plan, unless the
parties agree to a shorter duration.'
The reserve increment funds provide the primary security for the
TIF bonds, but the North Carolina legislation allows units to pledge
other forms of security. 45 The legislation expressly authorizes local
government units to back the bonds with proceeds from the sale of
property within the DFD, net revenues from public facilities financed
with TIF funds that are located within the DFD, and net revenues
from public facilities constructed or improved within the DFD
pursuant to the unit's development financing plan.46 In addition, a
unit may pledge any other available revenue stream as security as
long as the pledge does not constitute a pledge of the unit's taxing
power. 47 Technically, the enabling legislation does not forbid a unit
from pledging its full faith and credit as additional security, but doing
so triggers the voter approval requirements
that the constitution
48
imposes on other general obligation debts.
Though courts have consistently recognized a legal distinction
between special and general obligation debts,49 many opponents of
North Carolina's TIF legislation argue that whether a local
government unit secures TIF with reserve increment funds and other
revenue streams or secures the debt with a unit's full faith and credit
makes little practical difference.
To understand the critics'
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See id. (stating that when a local unit pledges its full faith and credit as security,
the unit shall "meet the requirements for (voter] approval of general obligation bonds
under Article 4 of this Chapter").
49. See, e.g., Martin v. N.C. Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 54, 175 S.E.2d 665, 679 (1970)
("Decisions of this Court establish that this method of [revenue bond] financing does not
create a debt within the meaning of the Constitution and therefore the limitations of
Article V, § 4, are inapplicable.").
50. See Charles Heatherly, Can We Afford More Local Debt?, CENTER FOR LOCAL
INNOVATION, at http://localinnovation.org/ideas/article.html?id=1874
(Sept. 11, 2004)
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argument, imagine a city that issues TIF bonds backed only by the
incremental revenues the city expects the TIF district to generate
over time. Because the TIF instruments are not backed by the city's
full faith and credit, the bonds are issued without voter approval.
Several years down the road, the TIF district proves unsuccessful and
the incremental revenues generated are not enough to service the
bonds. In order to protect the city's credit rating and their own
political reputations, city officials respond to the financial
predicament by raising tax rates to cover the shortfall. By doing so,
the city officials "voluntarily" reach the identical result that a pledge
of the city's full faith and credit would have required. 1
Thus, critics charge that TIF financing is simply a gimmick to
short-circuit constitutional constraints on local government debt.52
For example, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, a
group that lobbied against Amendment One, stated: "Amendment
One is simply another way to raise government debt without specific
voter approval, and your property taxes will be the tool .... Clearly,
local governments know that they can't sell these projects to voters
on their merits, so they want to bypass taxpayer consideration
altogether .... ,5 Without voter oversight, the critics argue, TIF will
become an instrument for corporate special interests and will allow
temporarily elected officials to "saddle future generations with longterm debt."54
The North Carolina Constitution does not require elected
officials to submit every legislative decision to the citizens for their
approval. Indeed, such a state of affairs would defeat the purpose of
representative democracy. What is unique, then, to the general debt
obligations of a local government that warrants such participation?
Also, do the same arguments for direct democracy hold in the context
of TIF, particularly in light of the argument that TIF may lead to
similar consequences?
The traditional policy rationales that drove the adoption of
various voter approval requirements over the past 150 years are not
as persuasive in the context of North Carolina's TIF legislation and
(arguing that towns will raise taxes in order to cover up TIF mistakes and prevent
embarrassment) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
51. See id.
52. See Marshall Lancaster, Those Starving Attorneys, CAROLINA J. ONLINE (Nov. 1,
2004),
at
http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display-exclusive.html?id=1918
(arguing that Amendment One's primary purpose was to override constitutional
protections against increases in debt levels) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
53. Lowrey, supra note 10.
54. Ashcraft, supra note 8.
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nineteenth
the
the complex world of modern public finance. In
century, states and municipalities invested heavily in economic
development subsidies, providing public subsidies to railroads and
other politically influential industries. 5 Corruption and economic
difficulties later forced these municipalities to default on their
obligations and left taxpayers paying for projects that were never
completed. 6 In response, many states amended their constitutions,
requiring local governments to seek voter approval before increasing
the unit's debt obligations.
Reformers must have believed that the bond election
requirements would serve one of two functions: (1) the elections
would provide substantive oversight to local officials' decisions
regarding debt, fiscal policy, and community priorities;58 or (2) the
elections would provide a procedural check that would increase the
political cost of pursuing a financing project.59 The first function
addressed the perception that the interests of the politicians did not
reflect the interests of the community, either because the politicians
did not have enough information to make a wise fiscal decision or
because they were acting in their own self-interest.6" The second
aspect of the direct democracy reform addressed procedural concerns
over unchecked authority regardless of the wisdom of any particular
proposal. Even where the officials' interests were aligned perfectly
with those of the community, the voting requirement served as an
important signal to the politicians that the ultimate power of the
purse remained in the hands of the people. This arrangement made
self-interested or corrupt measures more politically costly and gave
politicians more incentive to evaluate proposals closely before
presenting them to the people.61
55. Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
365,371 (2004).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 367 ("[Blond elections, again in theory, provide a mechanism for
efficient decisionmaking that local officials might avoid if they decided unilaterally
whether to construct capital projects.").
59. See id. at 375 (arguing that "[tihe very need to obtain voter approval" is a check
on official behavior which may be enough, despite their other shortcomings, to justify
bond elections).
60. See id. at 366 (arguing that direct democracy reduces agency costs).
61. This argument essentially relies on classic median voter theory-the theory that
direct democracy leads to a competitive decisionmaking process that results in policies
that approximate the preferences of the median voter. See John G. Matsusaka & Nolan
M. McCarty, PoliticalResource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives, 17 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 413, 414 (2001) (stating that voter initiatives, another form of direct
democracy, break the monopoly on decisionmaking and lead to median voter outcomes).
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In order to serve the substantive function effectively, citizens
must be able to understand and process the arguments both for and
against taking on more debt or, at least, be provided information
regarding the community's relative valuation of a particular project.
Garden variety general obligation measures typically involve tangible
projects designed to further basic community objectives, such as
constructing a school to solve overcrowding or improving a road to
combat gridlock. As such, the community can vote on the relative
need of the ultimate improvement even if they do not fully
understand the more complicated details of the municipality's
finances.
Today's more complex world of public financing options presents
several problems with this paradigm. There are now numerous ways
for cities and counties to finance their capital needs. 6 The myriad
structures and instruments can confuse even the most well-informed
voter.63 Most importantly, perhaps, is the growing complexity in the
uses of public finance. Not only are the mechanics more confusing
but some projects funded with public debt are difficult, if not
impossible, for the general public to evaluate intelligently.' Experts
have difficultly designing, measuring, and evaluating economic
When voter approval is required, therefore, officials have an incentive to tailor the
proposals to appeal to the community's median voter, submitting only those proposals for
voter approval that have broad community appeal and reasonable debt levels. See John
D. Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax-Exemption for
Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIz. L. REV. 841, 874 (1993) ("In effect, the
government will provide any good or service at approximately the demand of the median
voter, since any attempt to provide more than this will be voted down by the majority.");
Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 422 (2004) (stating that the median voter theory predicts that
parties will strategically position themselves around the median voter's interests).
62. Even when voters reject a debt proposal, local leaders will often ignore the will of
the voters and finance the same project through an alternative source. See Gillette, supra
note 55, at 366-67. Professor Gillette identifies several alternatives that local governments
throughout the country use to circumvent bond requirements:
"lease-purchase
arrangements, 'take-or-pay' obligations, non-apportionment debt, tax increment financing,
or any of the other myriad measures of 'creative financing.' " Id. at 373. Since many of
these "creative financing" alternatives were in use in North Carolina before the adoption
of Amendment One, they undercut the notion that TIF "took away" the citizens' right to
vote on local debt policies. See supra note 15 (discussing various mechanisms other than
TIF for financing local projects in North Carolina without voter approval); see also Jim
Holshouser, Letter to the Editor, Recovery Measure, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Oct. 22, 2004, at 16A (stating that TIF backed only by incremental tax revenues is similar
to the revenue bonds that local governments already use).
63. See, e.g., Ashcraft, supra note 8 (stating that the wording of the ballot measure for
Amendment One was "impossible to understand for the casual reader").
64. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 1050-51 (discussing the difficulty in establishing
objective proof of necessity or appropriateness of TIF).
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development efforts; 65 how are Jane and John Voter to sift through

the arguments?
To make matters worse, individual voters have little incentive to
educate themselves on bond measures, as their individual votes, taken
in isolation, are unlikely to affect the results.' Voter confusion leads
to several consequences that undercut the policy arguments behind

participatory decisionmaking in the context of public debt.
First, voter confusion leads to abstention. Studies have shown

that those who vote on ballot measures are "disproportionately white,

affluent, and well-educated. ' '67 Those who are less educated are more
likely to skip the measure completely, perhaps because they are less
likely to understand the wording of the plebiscite or the importance

of the issues involved. 68 Because the voting demographics most likely
do not represent the demographics of the community at large, the
vote may be skewed to such a degree that it is difficult to assign any
significance to the outcome.69 In the context of TIF, which was
initially designed for urban redevelopment, this phenomenon may be

particularly harmful as the least educated and poorest citizens tend to
be concentrated in inner-city areas.7" Thus, those who are most
65. See Louise A. Howells, Looking for the Butterfly Effect: An Analysis of Urban
Economic Development Under the Community Development Block Grant Program,16 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 383, 386 (1997) Howells argues that "it is difficult to assess the
success of any model in explaining and predicting economic growth and deterioration, or
to design programs that successfully affect the process in predictable ways" because of the
complexity and openness of the urban economy. She ultimately concludes that "the
perfect model is unattainable because it would be difficult to verify and impossible to
validate."
66. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1516
(1990) ("Because each individual voter has only a minor effect on political outcomes
decided by majorities, voters have little incentive to become well informed."). For a
discussion on the voting public's "rational ignorance" and its effects on democratic and
judicial processes, see generally Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of
Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287 (2004) (arguing that political ignorance
alters traditional notions regarding the countermajoritarian difficulty).
67. Eule, supra note 66, at 1515.
68. Id. at 1516 n.46.
69. See id. at 1519 (stating that it may be impossible to gauge popular will with
referenda).
70. See Peter Edelman, Where Race Meets Class: The 21" Century Civil Rights
Agenda, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 5-6 (2005) (recounting the middle class's
flight from urban to suburban areas in the 1960s and the staggering concentrations of
poverty that remained behind, but noting that the 2000 census detected a slight
improvement in the "worst concentrated poverty in most cities"); Lisa C. Young, Breaking
the Color Line: Zoning and Opportunity in America's Metropolitan Areas, 8 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 667, 667 (2005) ("As many studies and scholars have shown, opportunity is
inextricably linked to where one lives in this country ....Certain areas-especially urban
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affected by the TIF projects-those living in and around TIF
districts-may be the ones who are underrepresented in the deciding
vote.
Second, confusion leads to error. If a ballot measure is too
confusing, it may be difficult for voters, even if they understand the
fundamental aspects of the debate, to translate their preferences into
the corresponding answer on the ballot.71 Studies have shown that
ten to fifteen percent of voters, or perhaps more, cast votes that
contradict their stated policy preferences. Clearly, this is another
phenomenon that would disproportionately affect the poor and less
educated, potentially skewing the vote and diminishing the value of
the results as an expression of the "will of the people."73
Third, voter confusion leads to sloganeering 4 Because parties
typically offer little information and assistance to voters evaluating a
ballot measure, the influence of special interest groups becomes
magnified.75 In this information vacuum, interest groups can
influence public opinion through effective advertising and loaded or
pejorative descriptions of the ballot choices, as voters typically will
not be able to separate the signal from the noise.7 6 Apart from their
influence on how others vote, with low turnout and the possibility
that even those who turn out will skip the ballot measures, wellorganized and vocal minorities can determine the outcome of the vote
themselves.7 7

Bond elections may be especially vulnerable to the problems
associated with low voter turnout. Local governments tend to present
bond issues to the voters in special elections, isolating bond elections
from other ballot measures and democratic processes.78 Scholars
argue that the failure to use bond elections consistently and in
neighborhoods and inner-ring suburbs-are poor, dangerous, riddled with environmental
problems, and served by underachieving schools.").
71. Eule, supra note 66, at 1518.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 1515 (noting that "obstacles" to the voting process undercut the policy
arguments in favor of direct democracy).
74. Id. at 1517.
75. Id.
76. See id. (discussing the effectiveness of the cigarette industry's "education" efforts
on public opinion); see also Somin, supra note 66, at 1322 (stating that "relatively illinformed voters reliant on information shortcuts are unusually vulnerable to deception
and manipulation by political leaders").
77. See Gillette, supra note 55, at 368 (stating that elected officials circumventing
voting requirements may reach a more democratic result by preventing a vocal minority
from defeating a bond measure).
78. Id. at 384.
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conjunction with other "plebiscitary mechanisms" increases the costs
associated with voting and undermines public participation in the
process. 9 Therefore, voter turnout in bond elections tends to be
especially low.8"
The vote on Amendment One itself serves as a fine example of
the effect confusion can have on a ballot measure relating to public
finance. First, opponents argued that the wording on the ballot,8
which included only a summary of the amendment and not the
amendment itself, was misleading.8" The ballot measure used phrases
like "to promote local economic and community development" and

"qualified economic community improvements," which some argued
biased the uninformed voter in favor of the amendment.83 In
addition, the amendment seemed to deemphasize or obscure its effect
on the constitution's voting requirements-the measure never
mentioned the word "vote" or "voting," and instead stated that the

"financing is not subject to a referendum."' Others contended that
the amendment's wording was unnecessarily confusing.85 Perhaps as
a result of the confusion, more than sixteen percent of people who
79. See id. (arguing that voting can be viewed as a consumption good and that
"enhanced use of local plebiscites may increase the participatory benefits of voting").
80. Id.
81. On the ballot, Amendment One read:
[I FOR [I AGAINST
Constitutional amendment to promote local economic and community
development projects by (i) permitting the General Assembly to enact general
laws giving counties, cities, and towns the power to finance public improvements
associated with qualified private economic and community improvements within
development districts, as long as the financing is secured by the additional tax
revenues resulting from the enhanced property value within the development
district and is not secured by a pledge of the local government's faith and credit or
general taxing authority, which financing is not subject to a referendum; and (ii)
permitting the owners of property in the development district to agree to a
minimum tax value for their property, which is binding on future owners as long as
the development district is in existence.
Act of Aug. 7, 2003, ch. 403, § 24, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 1157, 1179 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-277.11 (2003)).
82. Ashcraft, supra note 8; Heatherly, supra note 50.
83. § 24, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1179; see Rob Schofield, On Its 3rd Try, Still a
Dubious Proposition,Editorial, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 19, 2004, at 11A
(stating that the ballot's "language carefully avoids" mentioning that voting for the
amendment eliminates the voters' right to approve bond measures: "[u]nder the terms of
Amendment One, North Carolina voters may well give up the constitutional right to vote
on PDFITIF bonds without even knowing they did it!").
84. § 24, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1179.
85. See Ashcraft, supra note 8 (stating that the wording of the amendment alone was
reason enough to reject it).
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voted in the presidential election abstained from voting on
Amendment One.86

Finally, supporters of the amendment reportedly spent $1.6
million on a public information campaign leading up to the vote.87
Groups for and against the amendment resorted to sloganeering in an
effort to "inform" and persuade voters; how one voted may have
depended upon whether he heard that the amendment would spur

economic development and job creation or whether he heard the
amendment's critics refer to it as "An Amendment for the Benefit of
Bond Attorneys, Investment Bankers, Financial Advisors and
Assorted Feasibility Consultants. 88 Given that North Carolina
voters had rejected virtually the same amendment twice before,89

voters must have heard more of the former rather than the latter, as
the amendment passed by a slim two percentage point margin of
victory. 90
To underscore the importance of the information
campaigns on both sides of the issue and their effect on the final vote,

it is worth noting that the amendment's supporters outspent their
opponents by an estimated factor of nine to one. 91
The problems with the substantive function of bond elections
extend beyond representation and confusion. Even if it were possible
to educate every voter completely, and even if voter turnout and
participation perfectly mirrored the city's population, the results of a
referendum may not reflect the community's true will. One scholar
has noted that it is practically impossible for voters in a democracy to
get their way every time-to get, in essence, their "ideal world."'

86. See 2004 General Election Results, supra note 1. The total number of votes cast
on each ballot measure were roughly equal. See id. (showing 2,933,570 votes cast on
Amendment One, 3,010,479 votes cast on Amendment Two, and 2,917,173 votes cast on
Amendment Three). Anecdotal evidence also supports the conclusion that voter
confusion on the ballot measures led to abstention. See Andrea Weigl, Three Amendments
on the Ballot Await a Tar Heel Yea or Nay, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 24,
2004, at 21A (quoting an early voter in the general election who abstained from voting on
the constitutional amendments because he was confused: "[The legislature] can write [the
ballot measures] inside out. You can end up voting for [the amendment] when you meant
to vote against it.").
87. See Rubin, supra note 2.
88. Lancaster, supra note 52.
89. North Carolina rejected similar TIF amendments in 1993 and 1982. Id.
90. Richard Craver, Voters OK Use of Self-Financing Bonds, WINSTON-SALEM J.,
Nov. 4, 2004, at B1.
91. See Binker, supra note 8 (stating that the AFPF, the primary lobbying body in
opposition to the amendment, spent only $175,000 in its effort to defeat the proposal,
roughly one-ninth of the $1.6 million spent in support of the amendment).
92. Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV.
434, 449 (1998).
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Inevitably, the voter will find herself in the minority on some issue.93

As people do not value the outcome of every ballot measure
equally-that is, not every decision is equally important to all
voters-they prioritize and seek outcomes that maximize the
possibility that they will be in the majority as to those issues most
important to them.94
Single-issue referenda make this balancing impossible as voters
are forced to decide yes or no on each issue separately.95 Because
ballot measures are incapable of measuring the intensity of one's
choice, individual measures could win simple majorities on their own
but lead to a world, or a collection of choices, that would not have
commanded a majority collectively. 96 Thus, referenda can actually
undermine democracy to the extent democracy is concerned with
identifying the will of the majority:
In populist terms, a referendum can obscure the voice of the
people by precluding them from trading outcome A in return
for higher priority outcomes. Although direct democracy
seems to give the people more input by allowing them to speak
directly to this issue or that, it may in fact inhibit the people's
ability to speak about the world as a whole. 7
Representative democracy finds power in this collective choice
paradox. In electing a representative, voters are not selecting one
outcome or one individual issue; instead, voters are voicing their
opinion as to their preferred set of outcomes. 98 This ability to choose
between wholes seems particularly powerful when applied to
economic development policy and issues of public finance, which
necessarily involve complex trade-offs, conflicting priorities, and the
possibility of unintended consequences. Elected officials, who are
able to make these decisions as part of a consistent, coherent, and
meaningful fiscal policy, would seem much better equipped to handle
such complexity. 99
93. Id. at 449-50.
94. Id. at 450.
95. See id. ("In this light, giving people an opportunity to describe their ideal world
through a series of plebiscites may be a false blessing.").
96. Id.
97. Id. at 451.
98. Id. at 449 (referring to this principle as "the fundamental Madisonian insight").
99. This argument does not hinge on infallible representatives. It is certainly possible
for poor public servants to occupy office at a time when these decisions have to be made,
and the results may not be any better (and may even be much worse) than those achieved
But whether direct democracy's piecemeal approach to
by direct democracy.
decisionmaking leads to an optimum collection of results seems a mere matter of chance.
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For example, many policy analysts point out that TIF districts
suffer from diminishing marginal returns if used too much in a
particular region. 100 Because the ultimate success of TIF districts
depends on outside dollars flowing into the development district, a
high concentration of TIF districts within one region reduces the rate
of return for all the TIF districts as there is only so much outside
money to go around. 10 1 It seems unlikely that sloganeering and other
propaganda would pick up on and develop this fine, yet critical, point,
and it is doubtful that information relating to total percentages of
land area devoted to TIF districts within one area would be included
on the ballot. Even if such information were included, it would most
likely lead to the confusion problems discussed above. A simple yes
or no choice on a ballot cannot capture and flesh out such policy
questions that are crucial to determining the likelihood of success for
individual TIF projects.
Finance referenda also encourage voters to evaluate proposals
based on their own self-interest, which may or may not reflect the
best interests of the community as a whole. In essence, every voter
tends to perform an individual, often intuitive, cost/benefit analysis
when selecting between finance proposals."° This trend has become
more pronounced in recent years, as a "consumer attitude" toward
government services has permeated through the electorate. 103 Prison
construction is a classic example of this phenomenon-voters often
reject prison bonds, even though they want elected officials to be
"tougher on crime." 1" For the majority of voters, the link between
the cost of the service (debt service on the bond and the potential for
higher taxes) and the benefit to the individual voter (arguably safer
streets) is simply too attenuated to gain any traction10
On the other hand, collective choice at least presents the opportunity to learn from past
decisions and adapt policies to meet changing needs in a more rational manner.
100. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 1038 (discussing the theory behind the diminishing
return critique).
101. Id.
102. See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What You Pay
For" Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 439-40 (2004) (arguing that
government's increasing reliance on user fees and other direct assessments has altered
how citizens view government services and taxes).
103. Id. at 440.
104. See David E. Pozen, Managing a Prison Marketplace: Prison Privatizationin the
United States and United Kingdom, 19 J.L. & POL. 253, 264 (2003) ("Throughout the late

1970s and early 1980s, citizens often voted down prison bonding proposals even as they
were simultaneously demanding that more criminals be imprisoned.").
105. Professor Reynolds cites a personal example of how the "consumer attitude"
affects bond elections and the manner in which the electorate debates public financing
decisions. See Reynolds, supra note 102, at 440. Arguing in support of a bond referendum
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Even if, as argued above, direct democracy is ill-suited to provide
substantive oversight in the TIF context, it may be necessary as a
procedural check on elected officials' authority to "saddle future
generations with long-term obligations." 10 6 Indeed, TIF legislation in
some states lacks the teeth to prevent abuse107-a problem that voter
oversight might help curb by increasing the political and procedural
"costs" of issuing TIF funds. But North Carolina's legislation is
replete with procedural safeguards designed to prevent the most
common forms of abuse.
In North Carolina, before TIF bonds can be issued, the issuing
government unit must develop and adopt a Development Financing
Plan. 08 The county commissioners or city council must hold a public
hearing on the proposed plan and notify all the property owners
within the district by mail." 9 The local government unit must also
publish notice of the meeting in the newspaper of general circulation
in the area.110 Among other things, the financing plan must include a
description of the financing district's boundaries, a list of all proposed
public and private development within the district, the base valuation
of the property within the district, the expected incremental value of
the property in the district, and the estimated duration of the
district."' In addition, the plan must describe how the district will
impact housing, the job market, and public services in and around the
district and provide for contingencies should the financing plan lead
to harmful, unintended consequences."' The statute also requires
that any manufacturer coming into the district must satisfy a
for the renovation and expansion of a local nursing home, Professor Reynolds states that
the bond proponents did not focus on the "whether the community, as an amalgam of
many different individuals of different ages and with different health needs, has a
responsibility to care for the elderly who need it," but instead harped on the possibility
that voters might one day require the use the nursing home's facilities and services. Id.
106. See Ashcraft, supra note 8.
107. Using eminent domain in conjunction with TIF districts to attract retailers is often
cited as one abuse. See Gordon, supra note 20, at 319 (stating that communities around St.
Louis use TIF "almost exclusively ...[to] compet[e] for new shopping malls"); Rodgers,
supra note 25, at 170 n.151 (citing the proposed development of a Target store in a "hot"
area of downtown Minneapolis as an example of TIF abuse); Benedict Sheehy,
Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24 J.L. & COM. 1, 41 (2004)
(stating that Wal-Mart has received more than $1 billion in government subsidies,
including TIF, and that such subsidies "undermine a community's ability to organize itself
to pursue its best interest").
108. Act of Aug. 7, 2003, ch. 403, §§ 18-19, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 1157, 1173-77
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-515.1,158-7.3 (2003).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
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minimum wage requirement unless exempted from the statute by the
Secretary of Commerce.11 3 Finally, the state must examine the plan
and confirm that it will not result in any material harm to the
environment." 4
Once the unit adopts a financing plan, the Local Government
Commission ("LGC") must approve the TIF proposal before any
debt instruments can be issued. 5 The LGC must find that TIF is
necessary for the economic development of the proposed territory
and that private development would not occur without the public
investment." 6 In addition, the LGC must determine whether the unit
has the capacity and controls to issue and service the bonds. 17
Finally, if the issuing unit is a municipal corporation, then it must also
submit the proposal to the county, which then has twenty-eight days
to reject it."8
The legislation also contains provisions to protect against specific
abuses. For example, to combat the diminishing returns problem
mentioned above,1 9 the legislation limits the total geographic area of
all financing districts to five percent of the unit's land area. 2 A DFD
can be expanded only during the first five years of its existence.121
The legislation also limits the ways in which counties can use TIF to
If a county creates a
attract service-oriented commercial activity.
financing district outside of a city's central business district, only
twenty percent of the total square footage of the development can be
used for retail or other service sector industries. 23 This provision
strip malls, "box
would limit a county's ability to use TIF to 1develop
24
TIF.
of
misuses
perceived
other
and
stores,"
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 2, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1159-60.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. §§ 18-19, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1173-77.
119. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
120. §8 18-19, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1173-77.
121. Id.
122. See id. § 19,2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1176.
123. Id.
124. North Carolina's TIF legislation authorizes local government units to use TIF
proceeds in finance districts created pursuant to two separate statutes. See id. § 2, N.C.
Sess. Laws at 1159 ("The proceeds of the debt instruments may be used either in a
development financing district established pursuant to G.S. 160A-515.1 or G.S. 158-7.3
.....
"). Section 158-7.3 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, which contains the
twenty percent square footage limit on service-oriented commercial activity, applies to
development districts created by a broad category of local government units--counties,
cities, towns, and incorporated villages. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.3(a)(3) (2003)
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Thus, the procedural cost of implementing TIF in North Carolina
is high-the procedural requirements are demanding, oversight is
layered, and specific provisions increase accountability and limit
potential abuses. Restoring voter approval requirements would do
little to add to the procedural checks already in place, and the added
time and expense necessary to obtain voter approval might limit the
flexibility and responsiveness of TIF to the point of defeating its
purpose.
Having determined that voter approval requirements would do
little to address any perceived countermajoritarian difficulty in the
context of TIF, one must be careful not to conclude that voter
approval requirements no longer serve any role in modern public
finance. To the contrary, issuing general obligation bonds with voter
approval produces several benefits for the community that may in
many instances outweigh whatever costs are associated with the
imperfections inherent in the process. First, the debt market
considers general obligation debt to be more secure than TIF bonds
and other specific obligations because it is backed by the taxing unit's
full faith and credit; therefore, cities and towns who submit bond
proposals to the voters for approval can borrow at lower interest rates
and lower long-term costs.1 25 Secondly, as Professor Gillette
hypothesizes, continued and consistent use of bond elections may
create some participatory benefits among the electorate, such as a
debate, and the "personal
more informed citizenry, increased public
126
benefits of becoming a better citizen.
Indeed, Professor Gillette concludes in his Article on local bond
elections that voter approval requirements create a beneficial
"bargaining structure" between elected officials and their constituents
that may call for more bond elections, not fewer. But instead of
basing his argument squarely on traditional notions of substantive
voter oversight, Professor Gillette offers a structural rationale for
bond election requirements with roots in median voter and game

(defining "unit of local government"). Cities, however, can also create a DFD pursuant to
section 160A-515.1, a statute that does not contain any square footage restriction on
service-oriented commercial development. See id. § 160A-515.1. For the purposes of
Chapter 160A, the term "city" includes cities, towns, and incorporated villages. Id.
§ 160A-1(a). The service-sector limitation, therefore, would likely apply only to counties,
as a city that wished to use TIF to attract service industries could circumvent section 1587.3's square footage restriction simply by creating a DFD pursuant to section 160A-515.1.
125. See Gillette, supra note 55, at 382 (stating that issuing municipalities will pay more
in interest on nonrecourse debt than when the municipality bears the risk of default itself).
126. Id. at 369 n.9.
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theories.'27 Acknowledging the imperfections associated with bond
election requirements, Professor Gillette argues that this cooperative
bargaining structure is better than the alternative-a system in which
voters never "scrutinize the need for or cost of" the proposed
projects. 128 But in the context of North Carolina's TIF legislation, it is
not a choice between voter approval and no oversight at all. As
shown, the North Carolina legislation contains procedural safeguards
and layered oversight that sufficiently raise the political cost of issuing
TIF and provide expert scrutiny as to the need and propriety of the
bonds. North Carolina's legislation, therefore, creates by statute the
sort of bargaining structure Professor Gillette envisions, but without
the costs, delays, or other problems associated with bond referenda.
The charge that TIF is illegitimate because it may lead to
countermajoritarian debt policies oversimplifies the issues and
ignores the intrinsic limitations and imperfections of bond elections.
Bond election campaigns may distort the complex issues on the
ballot, and the ballot itself may lead to confusion and abstention.
Even if an informed citizenry were able to wade through the issues
and cast their votes in accordance with their stated preferences, there
is no guarantee that the final result of the bond election would convey
any meaningful information to local officials regarding the
community's preferences and priorities. While bond elections,
despite these flaws, may provide an important procedural limitation
on official behavior, the North Carolina TIF legislation is already
replete with controls designed to limit the most prevalent forms of
abuse and ensure that localities implement TIF in a fiscally sound
manner.
Given the potential for corruption and abuse in the complex
world of public finance, financing structures that circumvent voter
approval requirements seem undesirable. In the context of North
Carolina's TIF legislation, however, voter approval requirements
would do little to curb such abuses and would result in increased costs
and unnecessary delays. The success of TIF in this state will not
depend on attempts to curb TIF's countermajoritarian effects, but on
determining when, how, and for what purpose TIF can be used to
127. See id. at 409 (stating that the ultimate benefit of bond elections may not be "their
capacity to counter the self-interested biases of local officials to overinvest in capital
spending," but on the predicted outcomes from the repeated bargaining situations bond
election requirements produce).
128. See id. at 408 (stating that the "relevant inquiry" when assessing matters of
"institutional design" is an inherently relative one-whether a particular restraint is
"effective" depends on the effectiveness of the available alternatives).
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further economic growth and raise the standard of living for all North
Carolinians. Answering those questions correctly should be the focus
of the TIF debate going forward.
P. MICHAEL JUBY

